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Abstract 
 
Does the formation of delusions involve abnormal reasoning? According to the 
prominent ‘two-factor’ theory of delusions (e.g., Coltheart, 2007), the answer is yes. 
The second factor in this theory is supposed to affect a deluded individual’s ability 
to evaluate candidates for belief. However, most published accounts of the two-
factor theory have not said much about the nature of this second factor. In an effort 
to remedy this shortcoming, Coltheart, Menzies and Sutton (2010) recently put 
forward a Bayesian account of inference in delusions. I outline some criticisms of this 
important account, and sketch an alternative account of delusional inference that, I 
argue, avoids these criticisms. Specifically, I argue that the second factor in delusion 
formation involves a systematic deviation from Bayesian updating, a deviation that 
may be characterized as a bias towards ‘explanatory adequacy’. I present a 
numerical model of this idea and show that my alternative account is broadly 
consistent with prominent prediction error models of delusion formation (e.g., 
Corlett, Murray et al., 2007). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The notion that the formation of delusions involves an inferential step is not new, 
and is enshrined in the definition of delusion provided by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000): delusions are ‘based on incorrect inference 
about external reality’ (p. 821). The claim that the inference concerned is an inference 
about ‘external reality’ is easily disputed1, but the stipulation that the inference be 
‘incorrect’ is controversial. To be sure, delusions can be extravagantly at variance 
with reality, but this does not prove that faulty inference is involved in their 
formation. After all, a valid inference from unsound premises may well yield a false 
conclusion.2 
 
Maher (e.g., 1992; 1999; Maher & Ross, 1984) has prominently argued that the 
inferential reasoning of deluded individuals is not significantly different to that of 
healthy individuals. Delusions, for Maher, are not a product of defective inferential 
reasoning, but reflect an attempt to explain intense and unusual phenomenological 
experiences. In Maher’s view, what is pathological in delusions is not the reasoning 
that is brought to bear on experiences, but the experiences themselves: ‘the locus of 
the pathology is in the neuropsychology of experience’ (Maher, 1999). 
 
Coltheart and colleagues (e.g., Coltheart, 2005; 2007; Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 
2007, 2011; Davies & Coltheart, 2000; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001; 
Langdon & Coltheart, 2000) agree that abnormal cognitive data3 may comprise a 
necessary factor in delusion formation. Indeed, for many delusions abnormal 
cognitive data have been identified or hypothesised that plausibly furnish the 
relevant delusional content (see Table 1). These authors argue, however, that 
abnormal cognitive data cannot be sufficient for delusion formation, because there 
are cases where the data in question appear to be present but where a delusion is 
absent (see fourth column of Table 1). Following important work by Ellis, Stone and 
Young (e.g., Ellis & Young, 1990; Stone & Young, 1997), Coltheart and colleagues 
thus postulate a second factor in delusion formation, a factor that affects a deluded 
individual’s ability to evaluate beliefs.4 Although most published accounts of the 
two-factor theory have not said much about the nature of this second factor5, one 
might assume that the second factor proposal is at odds with Maher’s contention 
that delusions arise via normal inferential responses to highly abnormal data. In a 
                                                
1 Certain delusions - delusions of thought insertion, for instance – clearly pertain to internal reality. 
2 Conversely, an invalid inference might yield a belief that is accidentally or serendipitously true (see 
Coltheart, 2009; Jaspers, 1946/1963; Spitzer, 1990). 
3 Coltheart et al. (2010; cf. Young, 2011) eschew the use of the word ‘experience’, noting that the 
cognitive abnormalities that initially prompt delusional hypotheses are not always consciously 
accessible (whereas the term ‘experience’ is used by many to refer only to mental events of which a 
person is conscious). 
4 Coltheart et al. (2010) adopt a ‘doxastic’ conception of delusions - they assume that delusions are 
beliefs. I also make this assumption (see Bayne & Pacherie, 2005, and Bortolotti, 2009, for defences of 
the doxastic conception). 
5 Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) recently suggested that the second factor is an impairment of 
working memory or executive function. See Coltheart (2007) regarding the possible neural basis of the 
second factor. 
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recent paper, however, Coltheart et al. (2010) put forward a Bayesian account of 
delusional inference that, they suggest, vindicates Maher’s contention. In my opinion 
the account they offer marks a real advance in thinking about the second factor in 
delusion formation, but incorporates some problematic assumptions. In what 
follows I will summarise their account (Section 2), highlight the problems that I see 
with it (Section 3), and then sketch an alternative account – drawing on Stone and 
Young (1997) and Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) - that, I will argue, solves these 
problems (Section 4). In particular, I will show that the alternative account, if correct, 
vindicates not Maher’s view but the view that delusions involve abnormal inference. 
I will also show that my alternative account is broadly consistent with prominent 
prediction error models of delusion formation (e.g., Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007; 
Corlett, Murray et al., 2007; Corlett, Krystal, Taylor, & Fletcher, 2009; Fletcher & 
Frith, 2009). 
 
A word about terminology: The Bayesian conception of belief is a probabilistic 
conception - one’s belief that p is represented by a value between 0 and 1, reflecting 
one’s degree of confidence in the proposition p. This conception can be contrasted 
with the binary, all-or-nothing conception of belief that standard accounts of the 
two-factor theory are predicated upon. On the binary conception, one either believes 
that p or doesn’t believe that p.6 Coltheart et al. (2010) employ both conceptions, but 
do not indicate how they are to be reconciled. This is problematic because there are 
deep inconsistencies between the two conceptions. For example, on the binary 
conception the notion of contradictory beliefs is straightforward – if one believed 
both p and its negation one would be caught in such a contradiction. On the 
probabilistic conception, however, it is normal to ‘believe’ two or more contradictory 
propositions, provided that the respective probabilistic beliefs sum to one. 
 
In what follows I will unify the two conceptions by treating binary belief as a special 
case of probabilistic belief. In particular I will take what Christensen (2004, p. 32) 
calls a ‘sub-certainty threshold approach’ to unification, by equating binary belief 
with a probabilistic belief that exceeds 0.5. To avoid confusion I will in general 
reserve the term ‘belief’ for those cases where the probability assigned to a 
hypothesis is greater than this arbitrary threshold. Thus I will speak of ‘adopting’, 
‘retaining’ and ‘rejecting’ hypotheses as beliefs. I will consider a hypothesis (and, by 
extension, a belief) to be true if the content of the proposition corresponds to reality 
and false if its content doesn’t correspond to reality. 
 
                                                
6 Given that ‘not believing that p’ can encompass both cases where one actively disbelieves that p (i.e., 
where one believes that not-p), and cases where one withholds judgement, some might prefer to see 
discrete belief as a trinary notion (Christensen, 2004). 
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TABLE 1 
Neuropsychological impairments with and without delusion (from Coltheart et al., 
2010, pp. 267-8; reprinted by permission of the publisher, Taylor & Francis 
Group, http://www.informaworld.com) 
 
 
Neuropsychological 
impairment 
Abnormal data generated by 
neuropsychological 
impairment 
 
Hypothesis abductively 
inferred to explain the 
abnormal data 
Cases where the 
neuropsychological 
impairment is present but 
there is no delusion 
Disconnection of face 
recognition system from 
autonomic system 
Highly familiar faces (e.g. 
wife’s face) no longer 
produce autonomic 
response 
‘That’s not my wife; 
it is some stranger 
who looks like her’ 
(Capgras delusion) 
Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1995. 
Autonomic system over-
responsive to faces 
Even the faces of 
strangers produce 
autonomic responses 
‘People I know are 
following me 
around; I don’t 
recognize  them; 
they are in disguise’ 
(Frégoli delusion) 
Patient experiences faces 
of strangers as highly 
familiar (Vuilleumier, 
Mohr, Valenza, Wetzel, & 
Landis, 2003). 
Autonomic system under-
responsive to all stimuli 
No emotional response to 
one’s environment 
‘I am dead’ 
(Cotard delusion) 
Pure autonomic failure: 
patient is not 
autonomically responsive 
to any stimuli (Heims, 
Critchley, Dolan, Mathias, 
& Cipolotti, 2004; 
Magnifico, Misra, Murray 
& Mathias, 1998) 
Mirror agnosia (loss of 
knowledge about how 
mirrors work) 
Mirrors are treated as 
windows 
‘This person can’t be 
me (because I am 
looking at him 
through a window, 
so he is in a different 
part of space than I)’ 
(Mirrored-self 
misidentification) 
Other cases of mirror 
agnosia (Binkofski, 
Buccino, Dohle, Seitz, & 
Freund, 1999) 
Impaired face processing When the patient looks 
into a mirror, the mental 
representation 
constructed of the face 
that is seen there does not 
match the representation 
of the patient’s face that is 
stored in long-term 
memory 
‘The person I am 
looking at in the 
mirror isn’t me’ 
(Mirrored-self 
misidentification) 
Many cases of 
prosopagnosia 
Failure of computation of 
sensory feedback from 
movement 
Voluntary movements no 
longer are sensed as 
voluntary 
‘Other people can 
cause my arm to 
move’ 
(Delusion of alien 
control) 
Haptic deafferentation: 
patient gets no sensory 
feedback from any actions 
performed (Fourneret, 
Paillard, Lamarre, Cole, & 
Jeannerod, 2002) 
Damage to motor area of 
brain controlling arm 
Left arm is paralysed; 
patient can’t move it. 
‘This arm [the 
patient’s left arm] 
isn’t mine; it is [some 
specified other 
person]’s’ 
(Somatoparaphrenia) 
Many cases of left-sided 
paralysis 
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2. A Bayesian Account of Inference in Delusions 
 
Coltheart et al. (2010) develop their account with reference to Capgras delusion, 
which involves the belief that a close friend or relative has been replaced by a 
physically identical impostor. Coltheart et al. endorse a prominent cognitive 
neuropsychological theory of this delusion (see Ellis & Young, 1990; Stone & Young, 
1997). According to this theory, the delusion stems from a neuropsychological 
disconnection of the face recognition system (itself intact) from the autonomic 
nervous system (itself intact). Individuals with this disconnection would lack the 
ordinary autonomic response to familiar faces. Put another way, faces that are 
visually familiar would be rendered autonomically unfamiliar (McKay & 
Kinsbourne, 2010). Coltheart et al. offer a Bayesian account of the inference from 
these discrepant familiarity data to the belief that a stranger is impersonating one’s 
friend or family member. 
 
Imagine that a man suffers a minor stroke on his way home from work one day and 
that his face recognition system becomes disconnected from his autonomic nervous 
system as a result. Let o represent the incongruous data available to him when 
encountering his wife at home that evening:  
 
 o: visual familiarity data in the absence of autonomic familiarity data 
 
How is this gentleman to explain o? Assume that there are just two mutually 
exclusive hypotheses under consideration: 7 
 
 hw: That woman who looks like my wife and claims to be my wife is in fact my wife 
 hs: That woman who looks like my wife and claims to be my wife is a stranger 
 
Let P(hw) represent the initial (‘prior’) probability assigned to the ‘wife hypothesis’ hw 
before he encounters her that evening, and let P(hs) represent the prior probability 
assigned to the ‘stranger hypothesis’ hs. These two priors, P(hw) and P(hs), are prior to 
the data o. Having observed o, which hypothesis is more probable? Another way of 
putting this is to ask which posterior probability (revised so as to take the data into 
account) is greater, P(hw|o) or P(hs|o)? 
 
Bayes’ theorem (Bayes, 1763) specifies the optimal procedure for updating the 
probabilities assigned to hypotheses in the light of new evidence. The posterior 
probability of the wife hypothesis using Bayes’ theorem is: 
 
 
P(h
w
| o) =
P(h
w
)!P(o | h
w
)
P(o)
      (1) 
                                                
7 As noted in fn. 3, the abnormal data that initially prompt delusional hypotheses are not always 
accessible to consciousness. Although I speak here of the ‘gentleman’, I make no assumptions about 
the extent to which the generation and evaluation of candidate hypotheses are conscious, person-level 
processes. In reality Bayesian inference is likely to be occurring simultaneously at many levels of a 
hierarchy (see Fletcher & Frith, 2009). 
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Likewise, the posterior probability of the stranger hypothesis is: 
 
 
! 
P(h
s
|o) =
P(h
s
) " P(o | h
s
)
P(o)
8      (2) 
 
 
In each case the posterior probability P(h|o) is proportional to the product of the 
prior probability P(h) and another term known as the likelihood, P(o|h). The 
likelihood denotes the probability of observing the data if the hypothesis in question 
were true – it represents how likely o would be under h. This term can be viewed as 
a measure of the explanatory power of the hypothesis with respect to o (Coltheart et 
al., 2010).9,10 
 
Coltheart et al. (2010) note that the posterior probability of the stranger hypothesis 
P(hs|o) can be much higher than the posterior probability of the wife hypothesis 
P(hw|o), provided that the relative explanatory power of the former offsets its 
relatively low prior probability. If this condition obtains, a rational individual (one 
who updates probabilities in accordance with the Bayesian prescription) will adopt 
the belief that the woman in his home is a stranger. A good way to see this is to 
consider the ratio of the two posterior probabilities, the posterior odds. The posterior 
odds in favour of the stranger hypothesis hs are: 
 
 
    
! 
P(h
s
|o)
P(h
w
|o)
=
P(h
s
)
P(h
w
)
"
P(o | h
s
)
P(o | h
w
)
      (3) 
 
 
The first and second terms to the right of this equation are known respectively as the 
                                                
8 Given that there are just two mutually exclusive hypotheses under consideration here, P(hs|o) is also 
equal to 1 - P(hw|o). 
9 According to Coltheart et al’s ‘probabilistic account of explanation’ (2010, p. 271), the value of the 
likelihood P(o|h) quantifies the degree to which a hypothesis h explains an observation o. Coltheart et 
al. thus equate explanatory power with likelihood, and in this paper I also adopt this conception of 
explanation (later I will speak of explanatory ‘adequacy’). There are, however, other views. For 
example, although Lipton (2004) notes that explanatory considerations may inform our estimates of 
likelihood because ‘lovelier explanations tend to make what they explain likelier’, he adds that ‘high 
likelihood is no guarantee of good explanation’ (p. 114; see also Aimola Davies & Davies, 2009). The 
observation o that my wife has two legs would be very likely under the hypothesis h that she is 
having an affair, so the likelihood P(o|h) is extremely high. But it is hard to see how the hypothesis 
that she is having an affair provides any explanation whatsoever (where explanation is understood in 
the sense of providing understanding) for the observed fact that she has two legs. 
10 The term P(o) denotes the prior probability of encountering the data o. In Bayes’ theorem this term 
functions as a normalising constant, ensuring that the posterior probabilities of all hypotheses under 
consideration sum to 1. 
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prior odds and the likelihood ratio.11 Coltheart et al’s (2010) point is that if the 
likelihood ratio is sufficiently high, the posterior odds in favour of the stranger 
hypothesis can be high even if the prior odds are low. 
 
So far the account of Coltheart et al. (2010) is consistent with Maher’s approach. 
Provided that the relative power of the stranger hypothesis to explain the discrepant 
familiarity data offsets the low prior probability of that hypothesis, the adoption of 
the impostor12 belief in the presence of these very abnormal data is ‘a perfectly 
rational response’ (Coltheart et al., 2010, p. 281). 
 
The notion that discrepancies between visual and autonomic familiarity data figure 
in the aetiology of Capgras delusion has received empirical support. A series of 
studies have now shown that whereas control participants show a pattern of 
autonomic discrimination (indexed by skin conductance response) between familiar 
and unfamiliar faces, Capgras patients do not (e.g., Brighetti, Bonifacci, Borlimi, & 
Ottaviani, 2007; Ellis, Young, Quayle, & de Pauw, 1997; Hirstein & Ramachandran, 
1997). Other work, however, suggests that such discrepancies are not sufficient for 
the delusion to develop. Tranel, Damasio and Damasio (1995) have shown that 
although patients with damage to ventromedial frontal regions of the brain also fail 
to show a pattern of autonomic discrimination between familiar and unfamiliar 
faces, these patients do not evince Capgras delusion. Coltheart et al. thus need an 
account of why these patients are different to the Capgras patients. If the impostor 
inference is the rational inference to make in the wake of discrepant familiarity data, 
why do the ventromedial frontal patients not make it? 
 
Coltheart et al. (2010) argue that, as time passes, individuals with the 
neuropsychological disconnection we have been considering will be confronted with 
new data relevant to the stranger hypothesis they have adopted as a belief – data 
that should undermine it: 
 
For example, the subject might learn that trusted friends and family believe the person is his 
wife, that this person wears a wedding ring that has his wife’s initials engraved in it, that this 
person knows things about the subject’s past life that only his wife could know, and so on. 
(Coltheart et al., 2010, p. 279). 
 
Coltheart et al. specify that these further data be represented by o*. They argue that 
whereas the original data, o, were more likely to be observed if the stranger 
hypothesis were true than if the wife hypothesis were true (i.e., P(o|hs) > P(o|hw)), 
the new data, o*, should be more likely to be observed if the wife hypothesis were 
                                                
11 Because the term P(o) is a constant denominator in equations (1) and (2) it is cancelled out in the 
multiplication process. 
12 Here I conflate the hypothesis that the woman who looks like one’s wife is a stranger with the 
hypothesis that one’s wife has been replaced by an impostor. When considering Capgras delusion it is 
often important to keep these hypotheses distinct; after all, there is an important difference between 
resembling one’s wife and posing as one’s wife. In Coltheart et al’s (2010) paper, however, hs is the 
hypothesis that the woman who looks like one’s wife and claims to be one’s wife is a stranger. I have 
kept this formulation of the stranger hypothesis and so use ‘stranger’ and ‘impostor’ interchangeably. 
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true than if the stranger hypothesis were true (i.e., P(o*|hw) > P(o*|hs)). Given o*, the 
explanatory power of the stranger hypothesis is relatively weak. In the wake of the 
new evidence o*, a rational participant should therefore reject hs and adopt hw. 
According to Coltheart et al., the patients with ventromedial frontal lesions update 
their beliefs in a rational manner, and end up adopting hw (the non-delusional 
belief). Of course, this claim raises a new question – in the wake of o*, why don’t the 
Capgras patients also reject hs and adopt hw? This is where Coltheart et al. invoke a 
second factor. In both the ventromedial frontal and the Capgras patients the face 
recognition system has become disconnected from the autonomic nervous system. 
This is Factor One. Coltheart et al. argue, however, that the Capgras patients – but 
not the ventromedial frontal patients - suffer a second impairment, an impaired 
ability to consider new evidence so as to revise current beliefs. This is Factor Two. 
Because of this second impairment, the Capgras patients reject or discount the 
evidence o*, and retain the delusional stranger belief (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Healthy individuals VMF patients Capgras patients 
Normal autonomic 
response to wife 
Factor 1: Lack of normal 
autonomic response to 
wife (yields data o) 
Factor 1: Lack of normal 
autonomic response to 
wife (yields data o) 
   
   
 Impostor belief Impostor belief 
   
   
  Factor 2:  Impaired 
ability to incorporate 
new evidence 
   
   
 New data o* New data o* 
   
   
Wife belief Wife belief Impostor belief 
 
Figure 1: Summary of the account of Coltheart et al. (2010) 
 
 
In summary, Coltheart et al. (2010) propose that the formation of a delusion requires 
two cognitive impairments. The first of these impairments (Factor One) will vary 
from delusion to delusion. In the case of Capgras delusion the first impairment 
involves the disconnection of the face recognition system from the autonomic 
nervous system, and yields discrepancies between visual and autonomic familiarity 
data (see Table 1 for a list of first factor neuropsychological impairments that 
putatively underpin a series of other delusions). The second impairment (Factor 
Two), however, represents a failure to adequately incorporate relevant evidence in 
belief revision, and is the same across different delusions. 
 
 10 
3. Problems with the Account of Coltheart et al. (2010) 
 
The account of delusional inference put forward by Coltheart et al. (2010) is vivid 
and detailed. There are, however, a number of potential problems with the story 
they tell. In this section I detail three such problems, in order of increasing 
seriousness; in the next section I sketch an alternative account that, I argue, avoids 
these problems. 
 
3.1 Is the ‘Stranger Inference’ Reasonable? 
As I noted above, Coltheart et al. (2010) consider that the ‘Stranger Inference’, the 
inference to hs, is a rational inference to make in the wake of discrepant familiarity 
data. Again, they show that the posterior probability of hs can be much higher than 
the posterior probability of the wife hypothesis hw, provided that the relative 
explanatory power of hs offsets its low prior probability. The numbers chosen by 
Coltheart et al. (2010) to illustrate this state of affairs are as follows: P(hs) = 0.01, P(hw) 
= 0.99, P(o|hs) = 0.999 and P(o|hw) = 0.001 (see second column of Table 2). 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Models of inference and resulting beliefs 
 
 Coltheart et al. (2010) 
input, Bayesian 
inference∗ 
Relatively realistic 
priors, Bayesian 
inference∗ 
Relatively realistic 
priors, bias towards 
explanatory 
adequacy∗∗ 
P(hs) 0.01 0.00027 0.00027 
P(hw) 0.99 0.99973 0.99973 
P(o|hs) 0.999 0.999 0.999 
P(o|hw) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
x 0 (Bayesian inference) 0 (Bayesian inference) 0.02 (adequacy bias) 
P(hs|o) 0.91 0.21 0.91 
P(hw|o) 0.09 0.79 0.09 
Capgras 
Delusion? 
Yes No Yes 
 
hs: ‘That woman who looks like my wife and claims to be my wife is a stranger’. 
hw: ‘That woman who looks like my wife and claims to be my wife is in fact my wife’. 
o: Visual familiarity data in the absence of autonomic familiarity data. 
x: A value in the interval (-1, +1). When x = 0 the individual has Bayesian beliefs; when x < 0 the 
individual is doxastically conservative; when x > 0 the individual is biased towards explanatory 
adequacy. See Appendix A. 
∗  See section 3.1 for workings. 
∗∗  See Appendix B for workings. 
 
 
In this case, it is true that the likelihood ratio in favour of the stranger hypothesis 
exceeds the prior odds in favour of the wife hypothesis. In fact, the former 
(0.999/0.001 = 999) exceeds the latter (0.99/0.01 = 99) by a factor of ten, and the 
posterior probability of the stranger hypothesis, P(hs|o) ≈ 0.91, is more than ten times 
greater than the posterior probability of the wife hypothesis, P(hw|o) ≈ 0.09: 
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! 
P(h
s
|o)
P(h
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|o)
=
P(h
s
)
P(h
w
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"
P(o | h
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)
P(o | h
w
)
#10.09      (4) 
 
            
However, are these numbers plausible? P(hs) = 0.01 seems unrealistically high - 
astonishingly high, in fact. A prior of 0.01 for hs means that the probability the 
individual assigns to the hypothesis that his wife has been replaced by an impostor 
at any given point - before he is confronted with any anomalous data - is one in a 
hundred. If this individual encounters his wife only once a day, he will expect her to 
be replaced by an impostor more than three times a year on average. It seems 
doubtful that any normal individual would have such a prior. Although there are 
cases in real life where people are fooled by confidence tricksters posing as their 
loved ones (see, for example, Grann, 2008), such cases are exceptionally rare. The 
stranger hypothesis hs thus represents an exceedingly unlikely – almost miraculous - 
state of affairs: 
 
If a miracle is defined as a violation of a law of nature, then a person should assign the 
hypothesis that a law has been violated a very low prior probability. Given this low prior 
probability, the posterior probability will be low too even though the likelihood function has 
a high value. (Coltheart et al., 2010, p. 273). 
 
The replacement of one’s wife by a physically identical impostor is a fantastically 
unlikely occurrence. P(hs) should thus be vanishingly small and the prior odds in 
favour of the wife hypothesis should be enormous.  
 
Let’s look at what a Bayesian with a more realistic (although still unusual) prior 
distribution over the two hypotheses would conclude, having observed o. I 
suggested above that a realistic prior for hs would be vanishingly small, but if we set 
P(hs) = 0.00027, in which case our individual will expect his wife to be replaced by an 
impostor about once every ten years on average (again assuming that he encounters 
his wife only once a day), then his posterior for the stranger hypothesis, P(hs|o) ≈ 
0.21, will be just 0.27 of that for the wife hypothesis, P(hw|o) ≈ 0.79, and he will reject 
hs (see third column of Table 2):13 
 
 
    
! 
P(h
s
|o)
P(h
w
|o)
=
P(h
s
)
P(h
w
)
"
P(o | h
s
)
P(o | h
w
)
# 0.27      (5) 
 
 
In this section I have questioned the claim that adoption of the impostor belief in the 
presence of discrepant familiarity data is ‘a perfectly rational response’ to those data 
(Coltheart et al., 2010, p. 281). It’s a rational response given certain values of the 
relevant priors and likelihoods, but some of those values seem highly implausible. 
There are, however, at least two responses that Coltheart et al. might make to the 
objections I have raised here. First, they might acknowledge that the priors they 
                                                
13 Here I have retained Coltheart et al’s figures for the two likelihoods, i.e., P(o|hs) = 0.999 and P(o|hw) 
= 0.001. 
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assigned to hs and hw were unrealistic, yet maintain that the relative explanatory 
power of hs might nevertheless offset its low prior probability. After all, the prior 
odds in favour of the wife hypothesis might well be enormous, but if the likelihood 
ratio in favour of the stranger hypothesis is even more enormous then a rational 
individual would adopt hs. If the data are especially salient, a reasonable individual 
might consider that the stranger hypothesis more than makes up in relative 
explanatory power what it lacks in prior plausibility: 
 
 
! 
P(o | h
s
)
P(o | h
w
)
>
P(h
w
)
P(h
s
)
       (6) 
 
 
A second response Coltheart et al. might make is to highlight a weaker sense in 
which delusions can be said to arise via inferential responses that are, if not quite 
rational, then at least normal or legitimate (see Coltheart et al., 2011). This sense 
involves distinguishing between the inferential processes that generate hypotheses - 
candidates for belief - and the inferential processes by which such candidates are 
evaluated (and ‘adopted’ or ‘rejected’, in binary shorthand). As Coltheart et al. (2010) 
note (see section 4.1 below), the hypotheses adopted as beliefs in many cases of 
delusion explain the unusual data that stimulate them – these data are what one 
would expect to observe if the hypotheses in question were true (i.e., the likelihoods 
of the respective data are high). In this sense, therefore, the hypotheses generated are 
reasonable or legitimate candidates for belief, given the data in question.  
 
The question of how hypotheses are generated is an important one, and the notion 
that considerations of explanatory power (again, see section 4.1 below) inform this 
process is compelling.14 However, although Coltheart et al. (2010) do repeatedly 
mention the generation of hypotheses that give rise to delusional beliefs, the most 
straightforward reading of their paper is as claiming that hypothesis evaluation is 
initially rational in delusion formation, and that is the position I have critiqued in 
this section.15 
 
3.2 Ventromedial Frontal Patients 
As Coltheart et al. (2010) acknowledge, their account ‘involves the conjecture that 
even the ventromedial patients initially experience the belief “This is not my wife” 
and only later abandon this belief in the face of contradictory evidence’ (p. 281). 
Coltheart et al. admit that they know of no evidence that ventromedial frontal 
                                                
14 In a related suggestion, Hohwy (2010) notes that in generating candidate hypotheses people are 
guided by a property transmission heuristic, such that the properties of hypothesized causes mirror 
the properties of the data these hypotheses are being generated to explain. For example, if the datum 
is an indentation in some clay with a particular shape, it would be natural to generate the hypothesis 
that the indentation was caused by an object with the same shape (White, 2009). 
15 Coltheart et al. (2010) state quite explicitly that hypothesis generation is not something that the 
Bayesian account applies to, and not something that can be assessed as rational or not: ‘[T]he account 
says nothing about where hypotheses come from. In the account, the provenance of hypotheses is not 
a matter for rational assessment. The account simply tells us when it is rational to accept a hypothesis 
on the basis of evidence, however the hypothesis is generated’ (2010, p. 274). 
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patients ever adopt the stranger belief. Nevertheless, this remains an empirical 
possibility. Another point that counts against this conjecture, however, stems from 
Coltheart et al’s account of how ventromedial frontal patients might give up hs once 
confronted with the new data represented by o*. The problem is that the new data o* 
are presumably coupled with the existing data o. After all, as Coltheart et al. say, ‘the 
failure of autonomic response to a spouse’s face is omnipresent’ (p. 283) – so those 
autonomic data would still be present once family and clinicians start offering their 
conflicting testimony. It may be true that, for ventromedial frontal patients, ‘the wife 
hypothesis explains the new data o* much, much better than the stranger hypothesis 
and hence P *(o*|hw) is much higher than P *(o*|hs)’ (p. 279). It’s not at all clear, 
however, that the wife hypothesis would explain the conjunction of o and o* better 
than the stranger hypothesis. If the ventromedial frontal patients had initially 
adopted the impostor belief, then the initial data o must have been salient enough to 
override the testimony of the wife herself, because P(hs) represented the prior 
probability assigned to the hypothesis that the woman who looked like the wife and 
claimed to be the wife was a stranger. Would these data not also override the testimony 
of friends and family (and the other new data represented by o*)? 
 
3.3 Implausible Chronology 
As discussed above, Coltheart et al. (2010) need an account of why Capgras 
sufferers, exposed to the same new data as the ventromedial frontal patients, 
respond differently to those patients. ‘Why do they not reject the stranger belief on 
the basis of these new data that disconfirm it?’ (p. 279). Why do they ‘disregard or 
reject all evidence that is inconsistent with [the stranger] hypothesis’ (p. 280)? To 
answer these questions, Coltheart et al. invoke the second factor. On their account, 
Capgras patients have Factor One (the neuropsychological disconnection), and 
adopt the delusional impostor belief as a result; but they also have Factor Two, 
which means they cannot subsequently revise this belief. 
 
One serious limitation of this proposal is that it requires a precise chronology (see 
third column of Figure 1). The second factor cannot predate the first, nor can it be 
acquired at the same time as the first. If the second factor were to take effect prior to 
(or simultaneous with) the first, it would render the patient unable to update his 
belief system on the basis of the new evidence constituted by the first! In order for 
Coltheart et al’s story to work, the individual in question would need to acquire 
Factor One first, and to adopt the delusional impostor belief. Then – before wife, 
friends, family and clinicans have any time to supply contrasting testimony – the 
gentleman would need to acquire Factor Two, rendering him unable to revise the 
delusional impostor belief in the light of subsequent testimony.16 
 
                                                
16 A further point is that having acquired Factor Two, the deluded patient should be rendered 
doxastically inert. If he is unable to update his belief system on the basis of new evidence, then he 
should not be able to revise his beliefs to accommodate, say, a change of government or a change in 
the weather. As far as I know there is no evidence for this kind of all-encompassing doxastic rigidity 
in deluded patients. One way to avoid this problem is to limit the scope of Factor Two, perhaps by 
suggesting that this factor is a domain-specific anomaly that is restricted to processing in a particular 
module or modules (see fn. 27). 
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4. An Alternative Account 
 
I’ve identified three problems with the account of delusional inference put forward 
by Coltheart et al. (2010). In view of these difficulties, it seems doubtful that both 
Capgras patients and ventromedial frontal patients adopt the stranger belief via 
rational (approximately Bayesian) inference from highly unusual data, and that 
whereas ventromedial frontal patients subsequently update further – ending up 
with the non-delusional ‘wife’ belief – Capgras patients are unable to update further. 
I’ve argued that the stranger hypothesis is so implausible that any normal individual 
should give it minimal initial credence. Also, I’ve suggested that if the 
neuropsychological data that stimulate the stranger hypothesis are so salient that 
they can compensate for the low prior probability of that hypothesis, then 
supplementary testimony from friends and clinicians will be powerless to 
overwhelm those data. Finally, I’ve shown that the story of Coltheart et al. requires a 
rather elaborate and implausible chronology. Here I outline an alternative account 
that avoids these problems. 
 
4.1 Doxastic Conservatism vs. Explanatory Adequacy 
Coltheart et al. (2010) state that ‘In delusional subjects… the balance between the 
whole background belief system and the particular evidence base is not successfully 
achieved’ (p. 276). This remark chimes with discussions in certain earlier papers. In 
particular, Stone and Young (1997; see also Davies & Coltheart, 2000; Aimola Davies 
& Davies, 2009) suggested that healthy belief formation involves a balance between 
two principles, one a principle of doxastic conservatism (whereby existing beliefs are 
maintained), the other a principle of observational adequacy (whereby the evidence 
of the senses is accommodated). Stone and Young suggested that delusions might be 
explained in terms of a bias towards observational adequacy.  
 
In the account of Coltheart et al. (2010), however, the second factor in delusion 
formation looks like a bias towards doxastic conservatism (although they do not use 
this term). After all, individuals with their second factor are said to be ‘impaired at 
revising preexisting beliefs on the basis of new evidence relevant to any particular 
belief’ (p. 282). As we have seen, there are a number of problems with this account. I 
think that these problems largely disappear, however, if we pursue the original 
suggestion of Stone and Young, although the tendency towards observational 
adequacy might, following Aimola Davies and Davies (2009), be better characterised 
as a tendency towards explanatory adequacy.17 
 
The fact that Coltheart et al. appear to conceive of the second factor as a bias towards 
doxastic conservatism is surprising, as they are quite aware of the explanatory 
adequacy of the various delusional hypotheses they consider. In discussing Cotard 
delusion (which involves the belief that one is dead), for example, they say: 
                                                
17 ‘The imperative of observational adequacy corresponds to the prepotent doxastic response of 
treating a perceptual experience as veridical (seeing is believing). The imperative of explanatory 
adequacy corresponds to a prepotent doxastic tendency towards acceptance of a hypothesis that 
explains a salient piece of evidence and is thereby confirmed’ (Aimola Davies & Davies, 2009, p. 293). 
Individuals with a bias towards explanatory adequacy are unduly influenced by the relative 
explanatory power of hypotheses. 
 15 
 
Suppose you suffered a form of brain damage that impaired the autonomic nervous system 
itself. Now you would not respond autonomically to any form of stimulation. What hypothesis 
might abductive inference yield that would be explanatorily adequate here? The hypothesis ‘I am 
dead’ is one such (because dead people are autonomically unresponsive). (Coltheart et al., 2010, 
p. 265; my emphasis.) 
 
The hypothesis ‘I am dead’ would explain a lack of autonomic responses to one’s 
environment – the latter data are precisely what one would expect if the hypothesis 
were true. Similarly, the hypothesis ‘Other people can cause my arm to move’ 
(endorsed by patients with delusions of alien control) would explain bodily 
movements that are not sensed as voluntary. And in Capgras delusion, of course, the 
stranger hypothesis, hs, would explain why a face that is visually familiar fails to 
elicit an autonomic response.18 
 
Bayes’ theorem can be viewed as a prescription for navigating between excessive 
tendencies towards explanatory adequacy and doxastic conservatism. It is possible, 
therefore, to illustrate each of these tendencies as systematic deviations from the 
Bayesian prescription (see Appendix A for a mathematical model of these 
deviations): 
 
 
P(h | o) =
P(h)P(o | h)
P( !h )P(o | !h )
!h "H
#
19     (7) 
 
 
An individual with a bias towards explanatory adequacy will update beliefs as if 
ignoring the relevant prior probabilities of candidate hypotheses.20  To the extent 
that he has this bias, his posterior for h, having observed data o, will approximate the 
ratio of the likelihood P(o|h) to the sum of the respective likelihoods of the 
explanatory data given the |H| mutually exclusive hypotheses under consideration: 
 
 
                                                
18 Coltheart et al’s account of Capgras delusion appears to rely on both the principles of explanatory 
adequacy and doxastic conservatism: they appeal to the former to account for why the stranger 
hypothesis is initially adopted (although, notably, they do not suggest that there is any departure 
from Bayesian inference here), and they invoke the latter to explain why, in Capgras patients (but not 
ventromedial frontal patients), the stranger belief is maintained in the face of subsequent 
disconfirmatory evidence. 
19 This version of Bayes’ theorem is derived from the version in (1) and (2) using the principle of 
marginalization (see Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008). H denotes the set of all hypotheses under 
consideration (|H| denotes the cardinality of the set H, i.e., the number of hypotheses considered by 
the agent). This version of Bayes’ rule makes it clear that P(h|o) is directly proportional to the product 
of P(h) and P(o|h), relative to the sum of these same scores – products of priors and likelihoods – for 
all alternative hypotheses considered by the agent (Griffiths et al., 2008). 
20 I make no claims about the actual computational processes producing these biases. One possibility 
is that the relevant probabilities are misassessed (in the case of a bias towards explanatory adequacy, 
for example, the individual might have a uniform prior distribution over the hypotheses in H). 
Another possibility is that the components of the Bayesian model are misaggregated, i.e., not combined 
according to Bayes’ rule (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; see also Hemsley & Garety, 1986). 
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An individual with a bias towards doxastic conservatism, on the other hand, will 
update beliefs as if ignoring the relevant likelihood functions. To the extent that she 
has this bias, her posterior for h, having observed data o, will approximate her prior 
for h: 
 
 
! 
P(h |o)" P(h)                 (9) 
 
 
4.2 Factor Two as a Bias Towards Explanatory Adequacy 
Following Stone and Young (1997), I suggest that the second factor in delusion 
formation comprises a bias towards explanatory adequacy.21,22 Capgras delusion, on 
this story, results when brain damage or disruption causes the face recognition 
system to become disconnected from the autonomic nervous system, generating the 
anomalous data o (Factor One). This disconnection occurs in conjunction with a bias 
towards explanatory adequacy (Factor Two), such that the individual updates beliefs 
as if ignoring the relevant prior probabilities of candidate hypotheses. He thus 
adopts as a belief the hypothesis that best explains the abnormal perceptual data 
available to him – the stranger hypothesis hs (see third column of Figure 2).23 
 
 
                                                
21 As I have already noted, Stone and Young (1997) referred to observational adequacy rather than 
explanatory adequacy. It’s worth adding that Stone and Young did not conceive of adequacy and 
conservatism in Bayesian terms. Indeed, whereas I have argued that Bayes’ theorem is a formula for 
balancing these competing demands, Stone and Young suggested ‘that there is no context-free 
balance to be advocated… no general context-free way to determine how [the tension between these 
principles] should be resolved’ (1997, pp. 349-59). 
22 The notion that delusions involve a bias towards explanatory adequacy is broadly consistent with 
evidence that deluded individuals ‘jump to conclusions’ on probabilistic reasoning tasks (e.g., see 
Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007). In a seminal study, Huq et al. 
(1988) drew beads (ostensibly at random) from one of two hidden jars – a mostly red jar (containing 
85 red beads and 15 yellow beads) or a mostly yellow jar (85 yellow, 15 red). Participants had to 
decide which jar the beads were being drawn from, and the experimenter continued to draw beads 
(to a maximum of 20) until this decision was reached. Huq et al. found that, relative to control 
participants, deluded participants required fewer draws before making a decision – and nearly half 
decided on the basis of just a single draw. One problem with this paradigm is that no information is 
given about the prior distribution over the two available options (e.g., a mostly red jar or a mostly 
yellow jar). In the absence of such information the most reasonable assumption is (arguably) that both 
options are equally likely (a uniform prior), and in that case the task cannot distinguish, at least on 
the basis of the initial draw, between an explanatory adequacy bias and Bayesian updating (in any 
case it is not at all clear how to infer beliefs from behavior in this task, as participants are typically 
given no financial incentive to persist). It would be interesting to compare the performance of 
deluded and control participants on incentivized variants of these tasks where the prior distribution 
over options is non-uniform (or where participants are informed as much). 
23 An explanatory adequacy bias can yield posteriors for hs and hw, given relatively realistic priors, 
that are equivalent to those in Coltheart et al’s (2010) example of Bayesian inference with unrealistic 
priors (see fourth column of Table 2; see Appendix B for detailed workings). 
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Figure 2: Summary of an alternative account based on Stone and Young (1997) and 
Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) 
 
 
This seems quite a parsimonious story – and it neatly solves the problems identified 
above. First, we no longer need to suggest that any (otherwise) normal individual 
with the Capgras first factor (the neuropsychological disconnection) will adopt the 
stranger hypothesis as a belief. The stranger hypothesis is so implausible as to make 
it virtually miraculous, and any reasonable individual will give it minimal credence. 
Individuals without Factor Two, therefore, will reject this hypothesis even in the face 
of data that strongly confirm it. Capgras patients, however, have Factor Two. They 
are biased towards explanatory adequacy, so are unduly influenced by the 
explanatory power of the stranger hypothesis and adopt it as a belief. Second, we no 
longer need to assume that ventromedial frontal patients ever adopt the stranger 
belief. These patients may well have the Capgras first factor, but they don’t have the 
second, general factor (the bias towards explanatory adequacy) – so for these 
patients the general implausibility of the impostor scenario outweighs its relative 
explanatory power and the wife belief is retained. Finally, we can dispense with the 
elaborate chronology – although two distinct cognitive abnormalities are postulated, 
we need make no assumptions about the timing of these abnormalities (compare 
Figures 1 and 2). They may arise simultaneously, independent results of the same 
neuropathological process; or one may predate the other. 
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4.3 Prediction Errors 
An important line of research into delusions involves the concept of prediction error. 
A prediction error is a discrepancy between what is expected and what actually 
comes to pass (Corlett, Honey et al., 2007). Such errors drive learning in organisms: 
they indicate a need to update beliefs about the world (Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher & 
Frith, 2009). Although normally prediction error signals are minimised when beliefs 
best approximate reality, prediction error models of delusion formation implicate a 
disturbance in the error-dependent updating of beliefs: delusions are conceived as 
attempts to accommodate inappropriately generated prediction error signals 
(Corlett, Honey et al., 2007; Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; see Kapur, 
2003). 
 
Recent experiments have provided impressive support for such models. For 
example, Corlett, Murray et al. (2007) had participants learn associations between 
certain foods and allergic reactions, and used fMRI to explore the impact on brain 
activity of subsequent trials that either confirmed or violated the participants’ 
engendered expectancies. Two groups of participants were tested, a group of 
patients with delusions and a group of healthy controls. Right prefrontal cortex 
(rPFC) responses24 in the patient group were indicative of disrupted prediction error 
processing: whereas for control participants rPFC activation was relatively strong for 
expectancy violations and relatively weak for expectancy confirmations, the 
magnitude of rPFC response to expectancy violations in the patient group was not 
significantly different from that for expectancy confirmations. Further, the more 
severe the delusions in the patient group, the less likely that rPFC activation 
distinguished violation and confirmation of expectancy. These findings suggest that, 
in deluded individuals, ‘the prefrontal cortex responds to physiological noise as if it 
were salient biological signal and drives the attribution of salience and attention to 
irrelevant and inconsequential environmental events’ (Corlett, Murray et al., 2007, p. 
2398). 
 
How might the concept of prediction error fit with the two-factor model of 
delusions? The most obvious suggestion is that aberrant prediction error signaling 
comprises the second factor. In terms of the scheme I have outlined above, an excess 
of prediction error signal is what underpins the bias towards explanatory adequacy. 
Prediction error signals are triggered by discrepancies between the data expected 
and the data encountered. Such signals render salient the unexpected data and 
initiate a revision of beliefs to accommodate these data. If there is an excess of 
prediction error signal, inappropriately heightened salience is attached to the data 
(Kapur, 2003), and belief revision is excessively accommodatory – biased towards 
explanatory adequacy. Seen in this light, Factors One and Two play essentially the 
same role – both factors result in salient data. Factor One generates data that are at 
odds with prior beliefs. This discrepancy triggers prediction error signals that render 
the data salient. Factor Two involves the endogenous generation of prediction error 
signals, ‘artificially’ heightening the salience of given data. One might think of Factor 
                                                
24 This brain region has previously been identified as a reliable marker for prediction error processing 
(e.g., Corlett et al., 2004). 
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One as generating the prediction error signal, and of Factor Two as turning up the 
gain on this signal. 
 
One implication of the above analysis is that, contrary to standard accounts of the 
two-factor theory, either factor might be sufficient in isolation to produce delusions. 
As I noted above, there are cases where salient data are presumably present but 
where a delusion is absent (again, see fourth column of Table 1). It may be that, in 
these cases, the salience of the data in question has simply not passed a certain 
threshold. It’s worth noting in this connection that prediction error theorists 
challenge the strict conceptual distinction between perception and belief upon which 
the two-factor account of delusions is predicated (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Mishara & 
Corlett, 2009). Such theorists see no need to implicate separate contributing factors at 
two levels, the experiential/perceptual and the inferential/doxastic. Rather, they 
implicate a single factor – aberrant prediction error signaling – that interferes with 
the updating of hypotheses across a broad perceptual-doxastic continuum.25,26 
Capgras delusion, for example, may result when aberrant prediction error signal 
results in inappropriate heightened salience being attached to a familiar other, 
engendering a perceived lack of familiarity with that person (Corlett, D’Souza, & 
Krystal, 2010). 
 
I have suggested that the second factor in delusion formation involves the excessive 
production of prediction error signal, driving a bias towards explanatory adequacy 
in belief revision. But what if the production of prediction error signal were 
attenuated rather than heightened? In this case, insufficient salience would be 
attached to discrepancies between expected and encountered data, and the impetus 
to revise beliefs would be weakened or removed. This would be a bias towards 
doxastic conservatism. It’s interesting to consider the types of psychopathology that 
might be associated with such a bias27. Potential candidates might include certain 
negative features of schizophrenia, for example catatonia. Fletcher and Frith (2009) 
have speculated that the same fundamental deficit (disrupted prediction error 
signalling) might account both for positive features such as delusions and negative 
features such as catatonia. My speculation here is more specific – that whereas 
delusions involve an excess of prediction error signalling, negative features such as 
                                                
25 Such models invoke a hierarchical Bayesian arrangement whereby the posteriors computed by 
lower levels of the system serve as priors for higher levels (and vice versa; see Fletcher & Frith, 2009). 
26 As a two-factor theorist, my view is that the distinction between perception and belief is not easily 
dispensed with - particularly at the personal level of description. As Martin Davies (personal 
communication) notes, ‘One indication of this is that obliterating the distinction between perception 
and belief seems to have the consequence that illusory perceptual states that are informationally 
encapsulated from most of a person's beliefs are liable to be counted as delusions.’ 
27 It seems likely that certain domain-specific biases towards doxastic conservatism represent 
biological adaptations. For example, according to Error Management Theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000; 
McKay & Efferson, 2010), biased beliefs in males about female sexual interest may have been adaptive 
in the ancestral past and may persist in modern males – a prediction that has garnered empirical 
support (Abbey, 1982; Haselton, 2003; Haselton & Buss, 2000). How might natural selection 
implement such ‘adaptive misbeliefs’ (McKay & Dennett, 2009)? Perhaps via hard-wired, domain-
specific priors, coupled with domain-specific biases towards doxastic conservatism that confer a 
resistance to disconfirmatory evidence. It would be interesting to investigate whether prediction error 
signal is attenuated when certain domain-specific expectancies are violated. 
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catatonia involve a decrement in such signalling (see Hohwy, 2004, for a similar 
idea). 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
To what extent does delusion formation involve abnormal inference? A number of 
distinct positions can be distinguished on this issue. First, there is the single-factor 
approach of Maher (e.g., 1992; 1999). Maher’s position is that delusion formation 
does not occur because inferential reasoning is abnormal, but rather because normal 
inferential reasoning is brought to bear on abnormal experience. Then there is the 
two-factor approach of Coltheart and colleagues (e.g., Coltheart, 2005; 2007). Like 
Maher, Coltheart and colleagues distinguish between experience and belief (or at 
least between data and belief; see fn. 3). Unlike Maher, however, they implicate 
abnormalities at both levels: two abnormalities with distinct neuropsychological 
underpinnings. Finally, there is the approach of prediction error theorists (e.g., 
Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Mishara & Corlett, 2009). Like Maher, such theorists argue 
that delusion formation can be explained with a single factor. Unlike Maher, 
however, these theorists disavow any strict conceptual separation between 
experience and belief. There is just one basic abnormality - aberrant prediction error 
signaling - that disrupts inference across the board. 
 
The recent Bayesian account of delusional inference put forward by Coltheart et al. 
(2010) is an impressive attempt to flesh out the two-factor theory of delusion 
formation, and in particular to say something specific about the nature of the second 
factor. I have outlined some criticisms of this account, and have sketched an 
alternative account of the second factor, based on the important contributions of 
Stone and Young (1997) and Aimola Davies and Davies (2009). In particular, I have 
argued that the second factor in delusion formation involves a systematic deviation 
from Bayesian updating, a deviation that may be characterized as a bias towards 
explanatory adequacy. I have connected this idea with prominent work on 
prediction error signalling, and have suggested that the bias in my model 
(represented by the variable x; see Appendix A) is driven by aberrant prediction 
error signal. At the default value (x = 0), prediction error signalling is normal, and 
individuals update beliefs in an approximately Bayesian fashion. Departures from 
this default correspond either to a dysfunctional surge in prediction error signalling 
(x !  1), underpinning a bias towards explanatory adequacy (and perhaps leading to 
bizarre delusions, as per my conception of the second factor); or to a pathological 
attenuation of such signalling (x !  -1), underpinning a conservative bias (and 
perhaps contributing to negative features such as catatonia). 
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Appendix A: A Model of Biased Inference 
 
Let us use the variable x to model biases towards explanatory adequacy and doxastic 
conservatism. Let x be a value in the interval (-1, +1). Now modify Bayes’ theorem as 
follows, incorporating the two piecewise-defined functions α(x) and β(x): 
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P(h |o) =
P(h) "# $ P(h) " 1|H |[ ][ ] $ P(o | h) "% $ P(o | h) " 1|H |[ ][ ]
P( & h ) "# $ P( & h ) " 1|H |[ ][ ] $ P(o | & h ) "% $ P(o | & h ) " 1|H |[ ][ ]
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Let us assume that the default value of x is 0 - this state reflects unbiased Bayesian 
inference. When x is 0, both α and β are 0, and the rather formidable theorem above 
is simply Bayes’ theorem: 
 
 
! 
P(h |o) =
P(h)P(o | h)
P( " h )P(o | " h )
" h #H
$
               (11) 
 
 
As x increases, however, the posterior P(h|o) will increasingly approximate the ratio 
of the likelihood P(o|h) to the sum of all relevant likelihoods, yielding an 
explanatory adequacy bias (see worked example in Appendix B); conversely, 
decreasing x will cause the posterior P(h|o) to increasingly approximate the prior 
P(h), reflecting a doxastic conservatism bias. 
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Appendix B: Worked Example of a Bias Towards Explanatory Adequacy 
 
Here we implement a bias towards explanatory adequacy (setting x = 0.02) in a 
situation where there are two hypotheses under consideration, hs and hw, i.e., H = {hs, 
hw} and |H| = 2. Relatively realistic priors are assigned for the two hypotheses and 
Coltheart et al’s figures for the two likelihoods are retained: P(hs) = 0.00027, P(hw) = 
0.99973, P(o|hs) = 0.999 and P(o|hw) = 0.001 (see section 3.1, and fourth column of 
Table 2). 
 
The model of biased inference (see Appendix A) is as follows: 
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Substituting x = 0.02 into the piecewise-defined functions α(x) and β(x) gives the 
following values of α and β: α = 0.02 and β = 0. Substituting these values into the 
equation for P(h|o) gives: 
 
 
P(h | o) =
P(h)! 0.02" P(h)! 1|H |[ ]#$ %&" P(o | h)[ ]
P( 'h )! 0.02" P( 'h )! 1|H |[ ]#$ %&" P(o | 'h )[ ]'h (H)
              (13) 
 
 
The equation for the posterior probability of the stranger hypothesis is thus: 
 
 
P(h
s
| o) =
P(h
s
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s
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Likewise, the equation for the posterior probability of the wife hypothesis is: 
 
 
P(h
w
| o) =
P(h
w
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w
)! 1|H |[ ]#$ %&" P(o | hw )[ ]
P(h
s
)! 0.02" P(h
s
)! 1|H |[ ]#$ %&" P(o | hs )[ ]#$ %&+ P(hw )! 0.02" P(hw )! 1|H |[ ]#$ %&" P(o | hw )[ ]#$ %&
      (15) 
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Substituting the above values for |H|, P(hs), P(hw), P(o|hs) and P(o|hw) gives the 
following solution for P(hs|o): 
 
 
P(h
s
| o) =
0.00027! 0.02" 0.00027! 0.5[ ]#$ %&" 0.999[ ]
0.00027! 0.02" 0.00027! 0.5[ ]#$ %&" 0.999[ ]#$ %&+ 0.99973! 0.02" 0.99973! 0.5[ ]#$ %&" 0.001[ ]#$ %&
   (16) 
 
 
!P(h
s
| o) " 0.91                     (17) 
 
 
…and this solution for P(hw|o): 
 
 
P(h
w
| o) =
0.99973! 0.02" 0.99973! 0.5[ ]#$ %&" 0.001[ ]
0.00027! 0.02" 0.00027! 0.5[ ]#$ %&" 0.999[ ]#$ %&+ 0.99973! 0.02" 0.99973! 0.5[ ]#$ %&" 0.001[ ]#$ %&
    (18) 
 
 
!P(h
w
| o) " 0.09                     (19) 
 
 
Thus with x = 0.02 and relatively realistic priors, the posterior probability of the 
stranger hypothesis (P(hs|o) 
! 
" 0.91) is more than ten times greater than the posterior 
probability of the wife hypothesis (P(hw|o) 
! 
" 0.09), and the individual will adopt the 
stranger hypothesis as a belief.  
